When Deleuze and Lacan (finally) Meet: The Singularity (Life) of Art in [Art] Education

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On April 9, 1988 at the 28th annual conference of the National Art Education Association (NAEA), held in Los Angeles, I presented a paper called “Lacan and the Issue of Feminist Art” under the auspices of the Women Caucus at the time. For me it was the start of a long journey of apprenticeship with Lacanian psychoanalytic thought that made its way through a personal touch with its most influential practitioner, Slavoj Žižek, in 1990 in Klagenfurt, Austria. Žižek, not well known at the time, was the spearhead of a small circle of philosopher friends who formed a Lacanian Psychoanalytic Circle in Ljubljana, about an hour away by car where I have made my part home for the past 25 years, Klagenfurt, Austria. His teacher and thesis advisor was the philosopher, Mladen Dolar who had studied with Lacan during Lacan’s remaining years, while Slavoj studied under Lacan’s brother-in-law, Jacques-Alain Miller, who is often chastised for having pushed Lacanian thought to yet more rigid structuralist limits by remaining true to the mathemes that Lacan had developed.1 From that circle, there is no doubt that Dolar, as reclusive as he is, has written exquisitely sophisticated explications of Lacanian thought, concentrating mostly on music, architecture and voice. But, it has been the prominence of Žižek globally, along with his fellow academic and friend, Alenka Zupančič, who have provided a contemporary revival of Lacanian thought. Žižek’s former spouse, Renata Salecl, also a gifted Lacanian theorist, who now has a position at the School of Economics in London and Miran Božovič, also part of the original circle, have made many contributions, but they seem pale in light of the extraordinary productivity of Žižek.
I begin this essay with this self-reflection to state that this apprenticeship came to an end of sorts for me around 2004–2005, when Deleuze and Guattari began to ‘make sense.’ While I had engaged in their thought in 1996, publishing a chapter in what was my first book, *The Anamorphic I(i)*, their difficulty, like that of Lacan, requires a patience, an apprenticeship and living through the frustrations of asking oneself, “why bother with this impossible incomprehensive ‘stuff’?” I am now unable to entertain Lacanian thought without their presence always coming through. It has been necessary for me, at least, to place this on the table, so that the reader has a firmer grasp where I am coming from. It is my contention that Lacanian thought is far from being ‘dead,’ or overwritten by Deleuze and Guattari, but a great deal of the early and middle Lacan is effectively questionable. A productive encounter between them is always possible around the psychic dimension of the Real, and I have tried to explore this especially in film theory through a lengthy introduction (Jagodzinski, 2012). The tension is between the remnants of Lacanian (post)humanist thought and Deleuze and Guattari’s posthuman thought. A productive in-between space (perhaps) can be worked with. Currently, one has to turn to the amorphous signifier of ‘speculative realism’ to see the challenges that are now taking place with a layer of younger scholars in their 40s.

If Lacan is accused of being too anthropocentric, then Deleuze and Guattari can also be accused of being too deanthropocentric, the singularity of our species being lost in machinic thought, like the one presented by De Landa (1997) in his attempt at an Earth history. Both caricatures are exaggerations, *but only slightly*. Lacan’s unconscious with its many mathematical influences has since been rethought as falling into second order cybernetics in the way language is coded unconsciously through symbols and not phonemes (Liu, 2010), while Guattari’s (1995) writings have essentially dispelled a complete deanthropomorphization, especially given that the work of Gilbert Simondon on ‘individuation’ (not individualization) greatly influenced both writers throughout their careers. This means, as difficult as it is for us to swallow, we are no longer shaped by alphabetization, but have shifted since mid-twentieth century into a reality shaped through ideographization and algorithmization, where digitalization has become the norm.
As a species, we are undergoing an involutionary change at the molecular levels of the brain that implications of which have yet to be understood as the literature indicates changes to brain structures with various forms of autism on the rise in populations that are highly medialized. To dispel this machinic aspect would be truly to fall into forms of modernist humanism, as if the technology of language was something completely controllable and manageable by our species, rather than recognizing its coding capacities. Human-machine relationships at the level of the unconscious have become crucial in theorizing the emerging reality. These developments all impact the morphological changes taking place in the 'arts.'

What follows is an exploration where (in keeping with a personal account) Lacan|Deleuze|Guattari come together in an assemblage to work out, as it were, a concept I have been developing in my work called self-reflexion for art and its pedagogy. It will become apparent why I use the grapheme of the capital X in what is a common established signifier in poststructuralism (self-reflexion) to forward the notion of 'difference' that Deleuze and Guattari (especially Deleuze) makes significant in his philosophy, and why Lacan's own use of 'difference' as 'singularity' can be broadened for art educators to move away from the overwhelming research and practice where representational thought marked by the binary difference and sameness that stubbornly persists in our field, and the continual focus on the “I” of creation as the seat of all ideas.

Both Deleuze and Lacan are non-representational thinkers. What does that mean? It means that they profoundly confront representational conscious thought, and especially commonsense that provides us with an understanding, and an assurance about the world as it “is:” how that world—our lived-life—is constantly confirmed, providing us with the self-assurance of our existence through habituation and repetition that reproduce belief systems. Lacan developed the notion of the “split-subject” as a result of the alienation that occurs when we acquire language. I think this position has become untenable to maintain because of its over-emphasis on the signifier of language. The most devastating claim as to why this is so comes from neurological studies, as well as neuroaesthetics. Human thought works independently of language, which requires a re-evaluation of the unconscious. Our species remains ‘split’ only in the sense it remains ‘unfinished.’ To posit a ‘lost’ originary object, as
Lacan does, is merely a logical paradox that equates with Deleuze|Guattari’s proposition that we are always-already in medias res; we are always positioned in the space-time of the in-between where relationships are being assembled along heterogeneous lines that are constantly undergoing change. Hence, a different conceptualization of the unconscious is needed than the one Lacan (and Freud) gave us. The unconscious as an Oedipal ‘theatre’ is replaced by an unconscious that is a ‘factory’ of producing desire. Unlike Deleuze, who posited the necessity of more emphasis on the brain,¹⁸ Lacan did no such thing. Neurological studies were of no interest to him (nor to Žižek.)¹⁹

Post-Lacanian developments do include an attempt at a reconciliation between neurology and his philosophy, notably by Mark Solms (2000), but the community by-and-large, perhaps because of the dominance of Žižek, have not paid much attention to this ‘reconciliation.’ This would mean the recognition of Deleuze and Guattari’s work on schizoanalysis, where the question of psychosis is given quite a different interpretation than simply as a ‘foreclosure’ (Verdrängung) [also ‘repudiation’ or ‘rejection’] of authority, ‘repression’ (Verwefung) in neurosis is rethought, and ‘disavowal’ (Verleugung) in perversion, as developed by Lacan’s Freudianism, questioned, dismissing much of Žižek’s own dismissal, not only of Deleuze, but his employment of these terms to cultural phenomena. In contrast to the ‘split-subject,’ in Anti-Oedipus (1983) a book still largely sympathetic to Lacan’s work, Deleuze|Guattari offer the most radical position of individuation, along with philosophers such as Alfred N. Whitehead, in dismissing the predominance of the subject-object correlationalism.¹⁰ Subjectivity is entirely decentred as desiring-production, which becomes a primary process. Desire is a flow – as plentitude not lack. It exists before the subject-object opposition. The privileging of structure and the signifier, and the pre-eminence of the Oedipus complex is replaced: “the unconscious is an orphan” (Deleuze|Guattari 1983, p. 49). As opposed to all posthumanist theories that posit the subject first, or primary, in both Lacanian and Deleuze|Guattari’s stance there is no ‘I’ that produces, but is a product that becomes produced; there is no subject before the unconscious is itself synthesized. This is a posthuman as opposed to a posthumanist stance.
Either way, be it Lacan or Deleuze, what they share is a turn away from all forms of classical posthumanism. How does the world present itself seemingly as a universe? Confronted with the dominance of existentialism as developed by Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in France, and the critical thought of the Frankfurt School in Germany, both Lacan and Deleuze radically rethought the nature of the subject and thought itself, each in their own way, influenced by the events of 1968. Lacan is best known for his three registers of being (Real, Imaginary, Symbolic – RIS), which have proven to be extraordinarily useful as explorations of socio-political issues, mostly developed by Žižek’s untiring drive to provoke the academic community out of its complacency through a performative style of jokes and laughter, which always have a profound sting at the end.

Lacan, for a great part of his career, privileged the Symbolic Order over the Imaginary and the Real, forwarding a Hegelian notion of desire as *lack* (*manqué*) that had its roots in the Master|Slave dialectic, the desire for recognition as interpreted and developed by Alexander Kojève, whose lectures greatly influenced him. This understanding of desire as lack is quite the opposite to Deleuze|Guattari’s own development, a significant point I will discuss later. Desire as lack, in the hands of Žižek, gained a great deal of mileage as it directly addressed the way ‘democratic’ capitalism manufactures desire through fantasy scenarios. One of Žižek’s titles, “a plague on fantasies,” brilliantly developed this very idea of what became the imperative by the Big Other to “enjoy!” Consume! Be happy! ; a satiation of the senses to satisfy and *contain* the drives through the manufacture of fantasies. This, coupled with an earlier caveat on cynicism as a form of (post)ideology that seem to stick, "Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es," Marx’s well-known saying, theorized as form of psychoanalytic *disavowal*, established his reputation as a formidable foe against the forces of conservativism.

The difficulty, of course, becomes the ‘why’ of the disavowal that remains hanging, other than being a cynicism that offers no particular ‘desire’ for change. Desire as lack has great explanatory power, but very little transformative power. It came at the right time given that Foucauldian developments of the power/knowledge couplet by the Academy of cultural studies, especially in the United States, were treated representationally as so many discourses that ‘construct’ the multiple
poststructuralist subject, a position Foucault himself did not hold. An influential structuralist reading of Marx via Louis Althusser (aided by Etienne Balibar and Jacques Rancière at the time), and the popularity of his notion of interpellation and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA’s), helped further consolidate psychoanalysis more along poststructuralist lines where the symbolic order (the State) played the dominant role. Deleuze and Guattari were nowhere to be seen or heard on the scale of Althusser and then Žižek.

Žižek, along with his philosophical companion Alain Badiou, has never directly accepted the thought of Deleuze (and his writing companion Guattari), yet, many of the ideas Žižek uses are basically Deleuzian that have been worked through into his own view of things. Deleuze is mentioned on occasion, however aside from the one terrible book he wrote on him, there has been no systematic follow-up. Hegel continues to preoccupy him, and it is precisely the Hegelian-Heideggerian tradition that Deleuze simply refuses to accept. There is, of course, a difference between Lacan and Žižek’s Lacan. In this essay I drop any references to Žižek (and Miller).

Lacan’s Real
In the latter part of his career, Lacan turned to the Real to further his thought on the unconscious “structured like a language.” This turn, in my opinion, was necessitated because of the challenge Deleuze and Guattari offered in the French context at the time by publishing Anti-Oedipus, a trenchant critique, not specifically directly at him, but to Freudian psychoanalysis. Lacan had already dismissed the Freudian developments by the International Psychoanalytic Association, which had ‘psychologized’ him, strengthening the ego. Education theory based on Freud has been of influence in the past, notably with Bruno Bettelheim. In the North American context the work of Deborah Britzman, relying on Anna Freud, has been influential. Jung, by-and-large, has not received as much weight in education specifically; a new generation of scholars, like Alexandra Fidyk are rectifying this neglect. When it comes to Lacan, the work of Peter Taubman, in terms of general education is significant. My own early work in the 90s attempted to bring Lacan into art education.
In the XXVII Seminar Lacan rethought the Oedipus myth, but it was the pressures surrounding Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical interventions and Luce Irigaray’s fierce feminist interventions into his ‘alleged’ phallocentrism (was it simply descriptive or prescriptive?), which made him focus and reevaluate the question of “the desire of the Other.” If desire is constantly caught by the Other, just how does transformative change take place? How do patients overcome their symptoms? Lacan’s answer was the “Discourse of the Analyst”: a point has to be reached when the analyst drops away, so to speak, as the analysand develops his or her own desires and begins to speak for him or herself. But, the hitch was that even when an analysands begin to figure out what their symptoms are, and what is the likely ‘cause’ of them, not all, perhaps most, are unwilling to change. Many who suffer from psychic symptoms do not need psychoanalytic intervention to function in the world. They ‘live’ with their symptom despite the suffering, it gives them creative joy, and hence the question of masochism remained of some concern for Lacan. He praised Deleuze in one of his seminars for addressing this very issue. Although Lacan was never able to ‘recruit’ Deleuze to his side, unlike Guattari, he recognized his genius, and hence the inspiration for the title of this essay.16

In the Deleuze|Guattarian context the concept of assemblage (agencement) plays a dominant role. It is a term, when developed together, emerges in Thousand Plateaus to capture the changing flows of heterogenous elements that come together to express productive desire within what they term as rhizomatic arrangements. When this appears like network theory (e.g. Bruno Latour and company), it should be pointed out that this is a mistaken analogy. The idea of assemblage emerged in their last book, What is Philosophy? (1994), however, as a concept it was developed in the early 70s. The stress is on desire when it comes to raising questions as to how assemblages change. Derterritorialization, as they put it, is perhaps more important than territorialization and reterritorialization, the other terms that define the “objectile” that is constantly changing. They stress that “relations are external to their terms,” meaning that no entity has a fixed identity; it can redefine itself when placed in another assemblage. One can see how powerful this is for art and its education since the notion of serialization of a process becomes so important as an artistic problematic is being worked out over a span of time. Time here is not necessarily
chronological but time as *dureé*, a concept they adopt from Henri Bergson. Such a time identifies the ‘events’ that change the processes of artistic production, and hence desire as the *assemblage* changes due to creation of new materials, tools, working on accidents that happen or the way affects of life undergo intensive transformations. Here Deleuze and Guattari call on the ethical work of Spinoza when they ask, "what a body can do." With changes of assemblage the potentiality of the artistic production changes as well. These aspects for art education have yet to be explored in any profound way, although a number of Australian scholars have done this when examining creativity, especially in the early grades (Davies & Gannon, 2009; Hickey-Moody, 2013; Webb, 2009).

Between Lacan and Deleuze, a serious issue lies between jouissance and joy when it comes to desire, which perhaps cannot be easily reconciled. Jouissance has been left ‘untranslated’ in the English language because of its specificity in Lacanianism. The usual understanding is tied up with the symptoms of unconscious desire. The compulsion to repeat (repetition compulsion) becomes a rather ambiguous state of affairs. On the one hand it can be considered a ‘normative’ function. We repeat things out of habit, this is necessary if we wish to function in the world and have some sort of consistency within it; yet on the other hand, the compulsion to repeat is also viewed as pathological leading to obsessive behavior, the ‘traumatizations’ that we avoid confronting, and so on. Here the ‘lack’ can come into play as unfulfillable desire. The concept of repetition seems underdeveloped in Lacan as opposed to Deleuze, who in *Difference and Repetition* (1994) discusses four forms of repetition: He reviews Hume’s notion of repetition as habit; Freud’s repetition as a compulsion to repeat, but goes on to include Bergson’s repetition when it comes to memory and the most important Nietzsche’s eternal return. The last is especially important in this essay when it comes to ‘art’ given that the only repetition where there is difference does a creative becoming take place. We can’t expect that all repetitions are qualified by this criteria. It illustrates how difficult creativity and transformative change is, rather than beset by forms of constant innovation and modification.

Bodily jouissance, by way of the drives, is also given an ambiguous position within Lacan’s structure as paradoxically painful pleasure or pleasurable pain. The one can invert into the other depending on the intensity of the force of the drive, so the
idea being drives have to be held in check through fantasy formations so that the they don’t overheat or overload, so to speak, as excessive pleasure and excessive pain. The range of aggressivity, hate, murderous feelings on one side are countered by sympathy tenderness, love and so on, at the other. Human existence, because of ‘lack’ or rather because the drives are intertwined to achieve the unattainable Thing (a sublime object that keeps us constantly in ‘dreaded’ disequilibrium) has another history. This can be a banal reading, but the stakes are much, much higher in Lacanian thought within the Master-slave dialectic when it comes to jouissance.

Lacan held that jouissance was associated with work and production: in Hegelian terms, the work of negation or as Thacker (2010) would put it, changing the world-as-is for the world-for us, which includes knowledge as well. However, it is the slave (proletariat, underdog, the one in debt) who does the production for the Master’s enjoyment. The master enjoys at the expense of the slave, in turn the Master is seen as ‘stupid,’ a degraded figure. This fantasy assures that neither truly challenges the other, the balance of power being played out through this unequal relationship. The mythical master becomes the imaginary representative of the Other, in the form of the Law and signifier of jouissance. This is a signifier without a signified, namely the Phallus. It spells death, and evil. This is the diabolical side of Lacan: Antigone’s ethics effectively disrupts (break apart: dia-bolon) the moral standards of a shared community.¹⁷

Jouissance is a bit of a moving target throughout Lacan’s writing, continually changing as a way to negotiate the economy and distributes it between use and uselessness to maintain some form of equilibrium as to what is and isn’t excessive. But what does that mean when in postmodern global economy these distinctions no longer hold?¹⁸ In Seminar XX a feminine jouissance appears in answer to Irigaray’s complaint regarding phallic jouissance. There is an even distribution of jouissance between the sexes. Many post-Lacanians have taken SXX as the moment where Lacan conceives to a non-phallic jouissance, which immediately is taken up as an ‘ethical jouissance,’ that is attached to Seminar VII. With this development a second wave of feminists¹⁹ who followed post-Lacanian thought, have attempted to rethink Lacan along an ethical jouissance. I am thinking here specifically of Mari Ruti’s writings (especially 2010, 2012), who has virtually humanized and existentialized
Lacan along these lines, and distanced herself from Žižek and company, including Badiou. I will address her developments below. It is perhaps here that some reconciliation can be made with Deleuze|Guattari, but how strong such a rapprochement is, and its consequences for art and its education, are still in some doubt.

**Pedagogy**

Deleuze and Guattari have been taken up unevenly in art education. By this, I mean that it is very easy to take up several key concepts that they have developed and utilize them in ways that are totally contra to their use throughout their oeuvre. The concept of rhizome has especially suffered in this regard, but so has the notion of ‘becoming.’ Why this is so seems to be that’s scholars who regularly contribute to art education apply Deleuze|Guattari’s concepts without recognizing the *perversity* that they themselves specifically put into play to ruin the representation of the signifier. Hence, their understanding of diagram is not the schema as is often thought, but more like an ‘undiagram,’ like Lyotard’s *figural* as opposed to *figure*. Nor is the rhizome ‘free’ of arboreal structures, but includes them as well. Dualisms seem to abound by authors in art education who ‘abuse and use’ Deleuze fashionably as Deleuze|Guattari’s both-and logic is replaced by notions of the subject as developed in poststructuralism.

For arts and its education, Deleuze|Guattari’s stress on creativity, which has been taken up by the creative industries of capitalism, attempts to develop creative activity as a ‘war machine’ in the sense that the elements of change that are already within a system are strengthened to transform the assemblage from within (immanent). The concept of the war machine that operates on movement, becoming and indifference to State Apparatuses was developed in opposition to the states forces that organize and distribute territories and bodies by creating borders and boundaries. Again, the perverse sense of their conceptual use has to be grasped. The war machine *fails* when it sets up hierarchies and actually designates ‘war.’ Otherwise, its forces and intensities are meant to struggle against territorializations that block desire in relation to the ethico-politics of the assemblage in question. What divides such a strategy from capitalist own forces of change is based on ethics against the fascistic tendencies
to territorialize for profit. Art education as a ‘war machine’ has yet to be worked out in any sort of detail as resistance is replaced with affirmative creativity.

**Self-reflexion and singularity**

Two overlapping concepts have some affinity with one another in Lacan and Deleuze | Guattari. Fantasy, again due to Žižek's influence, has had a great deal of play in the literature, wherein visual cultural studies in art education has taken this up where issues of ideology and representation have been given a psychoanalytic shift. For Deleuze, especially, fantasy is nothing other than ‘commonsense.’ *Difference and Repetition* (1994) is a critique to overcome representation, which is another term for commonsense. When ‘representation’ is equated with fantasy the correlation to commonsense emerges. We see in the work of Deleuze|Guattari the superiority of overcoming fantasy formations; that is, the hegemony of the signifier in the symbolic order that is held in place through the signifying chain of the Imaginary. From a Deleuze|Guattarian perspective it is the mobilization of difference as such that begins to ‘ruin’ representation and hence ‘ruin’ fantasy. How difference is to be introduced forms the bulk of *Thousand Plateaus* (1987) where a minor politics is worked out, along ways to ruin the ‘facialization machine’ of representation through ‘probe heads’ and a way to rethink becoming as an overcoming of any forms of static essentialized being (of identity politics, nationhood, and the like) through a geopolitics wherein the ‘dialectic’ is recast into the flows of territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

It should be pointed out that it is the emphasis on ‘deterritorialization’ where ‘becoming’ takes place. In the tenth and eleventh plateau, they develop a way to re-theorize the body affect along Spinozian lines as to “what a body can do,” how it affects and is affected, developing the concept of Body Without Organs, as a way to think ways that both healthy and sick bodies emerge depending on the assemblages they find themselves in. Such a development has been effectively applied to art by the writing of Simon O’Sullivan (especially, 2008) (see http://www.simonosullivan.net/). Applications to art education are only beginning (see, Wallin, 2010).

The concept of singularity appears throughout Deleuze|Guattari’s oeuvre. It equates to what Deleuze in his final monograph called “a life.” Life here has nothing
individual or personal about it, rather such life is paradoxically “inhuman.” It is inhuman in the sense it refers to life, which is not just human centered but distributive across organic and anorganic entities. Deleuze describes singularity in relation to the unpredictability or ideality of an event: “What is an ideal event? It is a singularity or rather a set of singularities or of singular points characterizing a mathematical curve, a physical state of affairs, a psychological or moral person. . . [Yet a singularity] is essentially pre-individual, non-personal, a-conceptual. It is quite indifferent to the individual and the collective, the personal and the impersonal, the particular and the general—and to their opposition. Singularity is neutral ” (Deleuze 1990, p. 52). As opposed to life as bios, we can call it life as zoë. What has this to do with art and education?

The general claim here is that such a grasp of the singularity of an event, for its inhuman; that is deanthropocentric aspects, is precisely what art’s ontological status is: composed of affects and precepts which are independent of ‘human’ perception. It is the manipulation of ‘blocs of sensation’ to give us dimension of the world to experience in new ways, which is what an artist does. What does art ‘do’ in relation to the way it offers dimensions of this impersonal ‘life’ (zoë) which is Deleuzian through and through. So, what value is this? To escape consumerist and commodification of art is difficult if not impossible within capitalism. But such is the attempt being proposed here. This is where ‘singularity’ comes into ethico-political play and would be exemplary of self-refleXivity. How then to shift the orientation of Deleuze |Guattari’s from their current commodification in art education? One way is to take their stance towards schizophrenia and schizoanalysis seriously. The ‘X’ in self-refleXivity refers to just that. It points to the inhuman, to ‘life’ as zoë, and to what they call the Outside.2 It can also be equated to Lacan’s notion of “undeadness” or his portrayal of the lamella as a libidinal force that “survives any division”— and that stands for “immortal life, or irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life” (Lacan 1964/1981, pp. 197–198). When Lacanians refer to undeadness it is the same notion of ‘a life’ that Deleuze is calling on. The question is that this is applied more to an anthropocentric view.

Schizophrenia for Deleuze|Guattari is given a privileged position as thought which appears inhuman, more likely to tap into the cosmic outside and avoid being
caught by correlationist propositions as the world is neurobiologically processed quite differently and non-rationally. The schizophrenic synthetically brings heterogeneous elements together that, nevertheless, have a strange plane of consistency about them, forming rhizomatic links that are truly creative. They appear likely to jolt us for a virtual dimension is tapped that is ‘out of joint’ with normative perception. While still ‘human,’ schizo thought patterns may be inhuman in terms of the myriad of becomings they may take: animal, mineral, bacterial, machinic and so on. No wonder ‘autistic’ production has strong affinities with this position and the entire development of so-called ‘outsider art.’

Deleuze’s aesthetic is not about fine art alone. It is about creativity that roils in the incessant production of the cosmos, the chaosmos as Guattari coined it – becoming as such. The degree that art is understood as an object or class of objects, or is identified at all or restricted to a particular arena or effect is not Deleuzian at all. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) say in What is Philosophy? “Art is a bundle of affects “…man’s nonhuman becoming… not resemblance … becoming is an extreme contiguity within a coupling of two sensations without resemblance” (p.173). Put another way: “Art wants to create the finite that restores the infinity: it lays out a plane of composition that, in turn, through the action of aesthetic figures, bears monuments or composite sensations” (p. 197). Art, oddly, is a ‘stain’ of infinity. The recognition of ‘art’ as sensation is always available everywhere. Given that ‘becoming’ is not about the subsistence of form but the productions born out of dynamic interference, art is envisioned in terms of affects and percept as to what it can “do.” This is not a strict functionality but the recognition that its effects can be ‘world’ altering. Thus understood, artistic potential resides in every moment in the necessary non-coherence of an actual and its virtual, between the moments of failed interpellation under Kantian categories (the faculties of mind), and the intensities that made such a reduction or condensation available.

These intensities are singularities for Deleuze. If individuation refers to process wherein the ‘individual’ is produced, then singularities (as the in-human forces – what I am calling the X) are the actors in that process of individuation.

“[S]ingularities are turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion and condensation, and boiling; points of tears and joy,
sickness and health, hope and anxiety, ‘sensitive’ points” (Deleuze 1990. p. 63).

Within matter itself, singularities are these points of tension and potentiality that are unique to that thing. Singularities only emerge as a play of forces or encounters between things. Haecceities is another term Deleuze|Guattari use for such singularities as changing and emerging topologies that have a unique form, which are always in motion, changing to new assemblages depending on the intensive forces that are in play.

Lacanian’s have taken up singularity quite differently. The writings of Mari Ruti (2012) are exemplary here in her turn away from Žižek and Badiou and drawing on the ethics of Lacan’s VII seminar by forwarding a feminine jouissance, yet still recognizing that phallic jouissance dominates, but must be countered. Desire as lack remains, which – if objet a as the ‘cause’ of productive desire is rethought as being a lesser refined term for the virtual (real) forces in the Real — could be reconciled with Deleuze|Guattari affirmative production of desire. This shift by Ruti is towards Lacan’s latter writings, beginning with Seminar XX to Seminar XXIII (1975-76), when he develops the notion of the sinthome to complicate his earlier theorizations of the symptom. James Joyce is his exemplar. As sinthome, the artist’s particular oeuvre becomes a way of ‘answering’ or ‘overcoming’ the Other. It becomes a creative endeavor when it comes to the imperative demand Che Vouï? (What is it you want of me?) that the Other asks of us. Post-Lacanian’s, especially feminists like Mari Ruti, Bracha L. Ettinger and Griselda Pollock have taken this route to develop a more compatible and sympathetic Lacan who addresses artistic activity.

The sinthome is closely related to singularity as now an artistic ‘quirk’ or ‘style’ has some affinities with Deleuze|Guattari’s theorizations on schizophrenia. However, rather than the machinic emphasis of desire where heterogeneous entities come together for social production within a haecceity, Ruti offers an existential and humanistic claim to singularity, which is certainly more appealing to many art educators given the turn to the ‘individuality’ of an artist can easily be inferred. There is, however, a significant overlap between these two conceptualizations of singularity. The clearest statements by Ruti (2010) come from her expositions on the singularity of ‘being.’ Here are two succinct statements that summarize her stance:
At the risk of oversimplifying, one might say that subjectivity, from a Lacanian perspective, is aligned with the symbolic, personality with the imaginary, and singularity with the real. The “subject” comes into existence through symbolic law and prohibition. “Personality” can never entirely transcend the narcissistic fantasies of wholeness, integration, and extraordinariness that buttress the subject’s imaginary relationship to the world. “Singularity,” in turn, relates to the rebellious drive energies of the [R]eal that elude both symbolic and imaginary closure; it opens to layers of being that exceed all social or intersubjective categories and classifications. (p. 1121)

Further,

If personality stipulates the kind of person a given individual is (e.g., timid, reserved, outgoing, charismatic), singularity expresses something about the specificity of the subject’s life orientation on the level of the drives and unconscious desire. As a result, it is more likely to transmit sudden flashes of eccentricity and idiosyncrasy than to support the performative play of masks that comprises personality in its conventional sense […] Singularity thus relates to those parts of the drive that manage to ooze through the sieve of the various systems of organization designed to stabilize human life. These parts are, as it were, the “inhuman” (not fully socialized) element that chafes against the “reasonable” facade of subjectivity and personality, lending the subject’s character an uncanny “monstrousness” beyond its symbolic and imaginary mandates. Singularity, in the Lacanian sense, is therefore not a particularly consoling or reassuring concept. (p. 1121)

The major difference between these conceptualizations is that Deleuze|Guattari present us with a cosmological view, while Lacanians narrow this to a human centered view. To view art education as an a-human endeavor that is directed as impersonal life can overlap only with Lacanians who would attempt or recognize this overlap. This has yet to be worked out. Ruti would seem to offers some reconciliation but her latter work has become even more and more humanistically based.24
Conclusion

This essay has explored some of the relationships between Deleuze|Guattari and Lacan specifically to raise the issue of inhuman life that exceeds anthropomorphism when it comes to art. As opposed to the majority of art education research that has called on Deleuze|Guattari where there has either been a misinterpretation as to their perverse use of concepts, or they have been humanized along poststructuralist and posthumanist lines (even phenomenological in some cases), the notion of self-reflexion has been forwarded as a reminder that the X refers to the inhumanness of the Outside, which art can reveal through the assemblages of affects and percepts.

The X is the singularity of an event, the forces of the virtual Real that are then counteractualized through artistic production in the direction of the posthuman. This is to say, art becomes ‘monumental’ in Deleuze|Guattari’s terms. Such artworks stands on their own in the way they offer us glimpses of the Outside. Singularity may well be a concept which offers the closest contact between Lacan and Deleuze|Guattari in terms of what might be called the ‘virtual Real.’

Yet, the emphasis by post-Lacanians remains anthropocentric. Perhaps psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis in the long run cannot be reconciled. The gulf between the two positions is unlikely to be bridged, but may well be ‘overcome’ via the current musings in speculative realism. If art education is not to be completely swallowed up by the creative industries, the shift from STEM to STEAM for example, and other such commodifying forces brought on by the ‘affective turn’ and immaterial labor, perhaps an adequate line of flight has yet to be found. I offer no solutions except to continue to explore post-Deleuzian and Guattarian developments for art and its education.
References


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1 Roudinesco (1997). “Miller’s interpretations shut [Lacan’s] work in on itself […] [His] concepts were now classified, labeled, tidied up, sanitized, and above all cleansed of their polysemic complexity” (p.305).

2 The academy in general has had a love/hate relationship with Lacan’s difficult writing style and seminar presentations. As a teacher, I would encourage the reading of Doug Aoki’s (2000) brilliant exposé as to why this is so, and why the need (if any) to ‘clarify’ what cannot, at times, be clarified.

3 There is no consistency amongst the philosophers who claim to be presenting an object-orientated-ontology (OOO). See Bryant, 2011.

4 The surprise here is that Claude Shannon, the pioneer of information theory transformed English into a statistical system of ideographic symbols (not to be confused with Chinese ‘ideographs’) by adding the letter ‘space’ to create ‘printed English,’ the forerunner of digitalization. Further, Shannon read Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*, which was already a mathematical construct and hence fascinated Lacan when developing his seminar on Joyce as the *sinthome*. The notion of the Symbolic Order emerges in Lacan’s theory when he is exposed to game theory and cybernetic hypothesis about the logic of the human psyche. Shannon was also interested in the word association games of Jung and Freud to statistically ascertain the unconscious structure of language. Liu (2010) presents these developments against the concerns and problematics of the Cold War.


6 To offer one example: “As I studied case after case of patients with severe language disorders caused by neurological diseases, I realized that no matter how much impairment
of language there was, the patient’s thought processes remained intact in their essentials (Damasio 1999, 108).

7 Those of whom have received the most recognition for this claim include: Damasio (especially 1995 and 1999), LeDoux (1998) and Ramachandran (especially, 1999).

8 As developed in his cinema books and in, What is Philosophy? written with Guattari, but mostly by him as Guattari was ill as the time.

9 Žižek’s (2009) dismissal is most evident in his reply to Catherine Malabou. See her retort (Malabou, 2012). Malabou has made it a point to dismiss psychoanalysis (and Žižek’s particular developments) when it comes to brain injured patients she works with.

10 Correlationism refers to the usual subject-object split as developed in western philosophy. The term has been made popular through the work of Meillesoux (2008).

11 By this I mean theories regarding the subject that insist on forms of self-identity, foremost being neoliberalism. Sadly, Foucault has been appropriated in this direction by American scholarship as developed by cultural studies throughout the 90s, and well into the 21st century where the post-structuralist subject becomes defined by the discursive formations that ‘write’ the body. Agency is reduced to resistance and then turns into identity politics.

12 I will refer to Deleuze only when I am specifically referring to his independent publications without Guattari, and to Guattari when referring to his single authored texts, especially when it comes to his concept of chaosmosis.

13 This development is somewhat dated now, beginning with Badiou’s (2000) dismissal of Deleuze as the philosopher of the One, and Žižek’s (2003) own engagement as Organs without Bodies and the academics response to their one-sided evaluations. Here Crockett (2013) is paradigmatic example to expose the issues. Žižek (2010) has addressed Deleuze in relation to Lacan’s Real, if only to champion Lacan once again. An obvious example: “And the irony is that the logic of repetition, elaborated by Deleuze, THE anti-Hegelian, is the very core of Hegelian dialectics: it relies on the properly dialectal relationship between temporal reality and the eternal Absolute.” It is statements such as this, which skew both Deleuze and Hegel into formulating Žižek’s own ‘Hegelianism’ at the expense of Deleuze. See http://www.lacan.com/symptom11/?p=346

14 The obvious reference here is his Magnus opus Less than Nothing (2012), but a new book on Hegel is already slated to appear soon, The Most Sublime Hysteric: Hegel with Lacan. In Less than Nothing, Žižek continues to think of Deleuze disparagingly already in the introduction as being one of the “scoundrels” who has no political agenda, and continues to dismiss him for his failures throughout of not getting it right when it comes to such issues, put in the broadest sense, of negation as opposed to affirmation.

15 My own ‘dismissal’ of Žižek’s position is presented in the following publications (jagodzinski, 2010, 2012, 2015). In a nutshell the notion of championing Lacanian ‘subjective destitution,’ where change is an uncompromising defiance through a dissociation of the social order (e.g., Antigone), and his concept of ‘revolution’ (as developed more forcefully by his co-theorist Alain Badiou) are for me dead ends. If more ‘dramatic’ examples of change come that are ‘revolutionary,’ they will be a result of the
slow apocalypse of climate change that is already occurring, or even a nuclear holocaust, rather than any forms of planetary gathering of the ‘multitude’ as put forth by the Deleuzian influences on Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*. Crassly put, the debate is between Deleuzian affirmation and Žižekian self-annihilation. Ironically, it will be our own self-annihilation, not an anthropomorphized Big Other to worry about as we will be extinct as a species.

16 See Daniel W. Smith’s (2004) interesting and provocative essay on when Deleuze and Lacan met, and his own worry about Žižek’s appropriation of Lacan (and Žižek’s (2004) response to this). Guattari remained a ‘Lacanian’ until the end. When Lacan created the Freudian School of Paris in 1964, Guattari was one of his lieutenants. He expected that he would be chosen to continue Lacan’s teaching with his own innovations, rather than Jacques-Alain Miller. Guattari (1995) called Miller’s structuralist dogmatism “a monstrous symbiosis between Moaism and Lacanism” (p.8).” The ‘true’ theoretical break between them came after *Anti-Oedipus. Thousand Plateaus* appears ten years latter when Lacan was ill and close to death (See Dosse, 2010, chapter 10).

17 The Žižekian position of subjective destitution, which leads to the claim the diabolical dimension of human desire has to be recognized for its ability to break the pleasure-reality principle (of capitalism and neoliberal humanism). Antigone, Bin Laden are placed on the same footing as exemplars of ethical violence. Such a position is challenged on many sectors, even from a Kierkegaardian position where Antigone’s ‘silence’ is the more damaging than any ‘act’ of diabolical desire.

18 Caught by the only holler in town – the Žižekian Enjoy!

19 One can point to ‘first wave’ feminists who dismissed Lacan because of his phallocentrism like Elizabeth Grosz.

20 See Wallin (2010) for a decisive account of the fate of the rhizome.

21 A good example is a/r/t/ography’s notion of an art educator who now becomes a formation of three interrelated and competing discourses: artist, teacher, and researcher. Rather than the assemblage as being the emergent product of the forces in play, the tripartite art educator is given priority. Yet, the influence of Deleuze |Guattari are often mentioned throughout these writings. See also the special of *Visual Art Research* (2013) edited by jagodzinski, Herrick and Wallin that addresses some of these concerns, as well as jagodzinski and Wallin (2013).

22 An attempt is found in jagodzinski (2014).

23 Ettinger (see 2006 for a review) developed the notion of the “matrixial gaze” which the art historian and strong feminist Griselda Pollock (2004) has embraced.

24 Here I am thinking of her work on love (2011) and character (2013), which are written for a more popular audience.