Images of killing and cannibalism occupy a significant site within popular imagination and visual culture, through prohibited, interrelated, and reinforced acts of social violence. While death itself is overdetermined in a broad range of representations, killing the other and eating the other, together or in their respective manifestations, are frequently described as unthinkable transgressions of social codes which help construct us as rational and disciplined human subjects. In psychoanalytic terms, we are subjects of the Law. Killing, and cannibalism, both affirm and transgress the limits of the social and it’s Law.

To speak of killing or eating flesh is, in many cases, to speak of monstrous, evil violence. This discourse is imbricated realms of social and cultural deviation, madness, and primitivism, among others. According to Žižek (2008), this discourse is mostly a subjective form of violence that

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**Violence and the Other in Contemporary Art: A Question of Ethics for Art Education**

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kernel of authoritarianism that, in part, encourages the bourgeoisie to disavow the poor, disregard material conditions of production, forget the lives of Others, and so on. In this sense, objective violence is the catastrophic consequence of the smooth functioning of economic and political systems (Žižek, 2008). Objective violence is also inherent in language itself and systems of language. As Derrida asserted:

Violence begins in language, in the very act of naming, for the originary violence of language... consists of inscribing within difference... the initial violence of naming leads to logocentrism and the reparatory violence of the supplement, for the metaphysics of presence continue to mask the underlying violence of naming... violence continues from its first moment in the violence of the arche-writing, the violence of difference, of classification, and of the system of appellations. (as cited in Kline, 1995, p. 30)

From a Lacanian perspective, while language appears on the surface to be a mediating force of nonviolence (i.e., talking it through), it involves unconditional violence. “It is language itself which pushes our desire beyond its proper limits... elevating it into an absolute striving that can never be satisfied” (Žižek, 2008, p. 65). Objective violence, then, is inherent in language itself through a desire to speak, name, and categorize difference (including the so-called language of images). Violence through language is inherent in the desire to be a full-fledged, self-reflective, rational subject who participates in the political economic system. And, of course, the system itself is objectively violent, producing subjects that reproduce the catastrophic effects of economic and political systems. Art and art education are not immune.

In what follows, two artworks that express subjective and objective violence are interpreted through Lacanian psychoanalytic and Levinasian theories, respectively. Both theories have been adopted recently by art educators (jagodzinski, 2010; Kallio-Tavin, 2013; Springgay, Irwin, & Leggo, 2007; Walker, 2009), yet are often deployed as two fundamentally different bodies of thought. To address this “missed encounter” (Harasym, 1998), we offer a reapproachment between the Levinas’s ethics and Lacan’s ethics of the Real, and then offer some recommendations for a pedagogy of provocation.
Zhu Yu

Against the backdrop of objective violence from an emerging form of communist-capitalism, Zhu Yu, a Chinese performance artist, engaged in an artwork entitled *Eating People* (2000). The artist walked out of a restaurant kitchen in Shanghai with a plate containing flesh from the cooked corpse of infants “that had been rumored to be stolen from a medical school” (Rojas, 2002, p. 4). Zhu Yu sat down at a table with a white linen tablecloth and began to consume the flesh. As part of the performance, Zhu Yu publicly stated the following:

One question that always stymies us, that is, why cannot people eat people? Is there a commandment in man’s religion in which it is written that we cannot eat people? In what country is there a law against eating people?... [Is it not] simply something that man whimsically changes from time to time based on his/her own so-called needs of human being in the course of human progress? (Hua, Ai, & Feng, 2000, p. 192)

The context of Zhu Yu’s *Eating People* included the larger phenomenon of flesh art in contemporary China and shock-art elsewhere around the globe in the second half of the 1990s (Teo, 2012). Its larger goal was to challenge ideas and ideals about art and morality, often by interrogating the relationship between death, flesh, and horror. As part of a particular and provocative series of performances, *Obsession with Injury* (2000), the artists involved animal and human corpses and their own bodies to challenge conventional assumptions about the limits of both human ethics and Chinese mortality (Rojas, 2002). The artists described their project in the following terms: “we have always wanted to explore fundamental problems concerning the existence and death of human beings, as well as the transformative process of spirit into material” (Wu, 2001, p. 207).

One way to interpret *Eating People*, its continuous reproductions, and the ongoing discourse it has engendered, is through the relationship between subjective and objective violence and the limits of ethics. In this sense, the artwork might be interpreted as opening up the social order and its lack by reflecting a larger perception expressed by Chinese artists over the last decade of the 20th century—the perception that there is a lack of effective public forums to express concerns and dissent regarding the political economy—the move toward communist-capitalism. Teo (2012) stated
that this artwork “disturbingly encapsulated the social pathology, as well as perhaps the frightening teleology, of Deng’s market socialism” (p. 180). In line with this perspective, perhaps Zhu Yu used his body and the Other’s body as a text of subjective violence in which spectators, in particular the Chinese populace, inscribe their transgressions of the body politic: the objective violence of the Big Other.

The Big Other is manifested through the symbolic register, the world of signifiers and discourse, rules and regulations, society and institutions (Tavin, 2010). The symbolic register is where law, structure, and language coexist together to construct and police desire, characterize culture, and regulate ethics and morality (Evans, 1996). As part of a current wave of interest in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, art educators such as Atkinson (2004), Hetrick (2010), jagodzinski (2004, 2005, 2010), Thomas (2012), and Walker (2010) have explored the potential of symbolic register. Atkinson (2004) clarified that the symbolic concerns identification with the place from where we are observed...

institutional practices and discourses such as law, medicine or education that position and regulate individuals as subjects. These identification processes can be seen as regulatory systems in which the gaze of symbolic identification tends to dominate. The symbolic order is the order of language and other social practices in which we acquire our subjectivity and identity. It is the order in and through which we understand ourselves, the world and others. (p. 395)

The Big Other (similar to the Freudian primordial Father) is always already dead and returns through the gaze and the objective and violent language of symbolic fictions. In Zhu Yu’s art, the Big Other in post-Maoist China may be interpreted as manifesting from “the passage from direct brutal force to the rule of symbolic authority, of prohibitory law [which] is always grounded in a (disavowed) act of primordial crime” (Žižek, 1997, p. 2).

From a Lacanian perspective, Zhu Yu’s work attempts to suspend the existing ethical and moral frame of objective violence in which the work is made. In a sense, it accomplishes this act by confronting the very notion of violence through the act itself, through radical “shock.” As art educator jan jagodzinski (2005) stated, “the radical position of ‘society does not exist’ or ‘the Big Other does not exist’ means confronting
the fantasy that there is nothing behind this Other, no paranoia of the Other of the Other controlling and manipulating things” (p. 269). Zhu Yu’s work may also be interpreted as confronting the idea that subjects without Law often turn to the violence of the Real of the body itself: sometimes our body, sometimes other bodies; cutting, tattooing, piercing, mutilating, and so on. In this sense, a subject without Law should not be understood in the vernacular sense (no courts, no police, no lawyers, etc.). Instead, it refers to the subject not as a “subject” to the rule of the Big Other and, therefore, in search of a defiant stance against the symbolic order—a transgressionary move, cathected with libidinal intensity (jagodzinski, 2005).

If we interpret Zhu Yu’s performance as a cut into the body (both the body politic and the body of the flesh), difficult questions are raised about the relationship between objective violence and desire, of us ingesting and incorporating an Other; of breaking down distance between perceiving the Other and, in this case, eating the Other. Based on Lacanian theory, by internalizing the inherent distance between one subject and the Other, an anxiety may develop that strips the violent fantasy of the Big Other as Master. This, in turn, may lead to what jagodzinski (2008) called an Ethics of the Real. It is “at first a passage from knowledge to ‘thought in thought’ and then a search for a founding signifier, since this is a groundless state” (p. 103). The Real, another Lacanian register, can be understood as the site of incompleteness against the symbolic order. The Real is the site of interference and irruption, disturbing the “very boundary separating the ‘outside’ from the ‘inside’” (Žižek, 1999, p. 19). The structural effect that separates the inside from the outside is abolished in, and as an effect of, the Real.

Zhu Yu’s performance might be seen as an encounter with the Real psychic dimension of bodily experience, as a form of negativity of distance. If we experience the reproductions of the performance through an affective relationship, gaps in the Real come to the surface of our collective skin-ego through the loss of self-mastery. The image of the disembodied flesh, for example, enters into our unconscious where, at the level of the Real, our body remains fragmented and in pieces. Perhaps this moment of jouissance instigated by the cut, the collapsing of distance between subject and object, helps to create enough distance from our loss of intimacy to, paradoxically, bring us closer to thinking about the Other. Such an ethics, as jagodzinski (2008)
stated, “means decentering the egoic self, coming to terms with the misrecognitions in Lacan’s terms, and extending oneself to the non-human and inhuman alike, the ‘beasts’ that dwell throughout” (p. 137). Jagodzinski (2004) continued: “The monstrous, aggressive, ugly, slime, a formless substance, its radical evilness asserts itself in the impossibility of its containment. This is the Real death revisits the subject through the crevasse of the cut” (pp. 61-62).

Surrounding cuts in the flesh in Zhu Yu’s work are small reminders and disturbances of our own gaze, which can also be interpreted as the gaze of the Big Other. In a still image from the performance, a dissected human eye on a large poster behind the artist reminds us that our vision is never pure, what is seen is always misrecognized, and we are always in the picture of evil, so to speak. This evil, in the form of the eye, forces the “I” (the supposed rational and disciplined subject) in us to face our subjective destitution. Perhaps we are caught gazing into the symbolic order of the objectively violent act, and therefore too close to the thing that now stares back at us. Through Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, we might interpret Zhu Yu’s objective and subjective violent artwork as coming face-to-face with the possibility of our own death, dissection, and digestion. Evil, as Žižek (1993) pointed out, “is another name for the ‘death drive,’ for the fixation on some Thing which derails our customary life-circuit” (p. 96). Perhaps through this derailment, with this artwork or some other “thing,” we confront the horror within ourselves, and then turn cannibalism and evil into the possibility of new life. In this sense, when we are confronted with our own gaze, we might experience a kind of self-cannibalization that opens up for the possibility for an Ethics of the Real.

Teemu Mäki

Teemu Mäki is a contemporary Finnish artist, who, in video artwork, My Way, a Work in Progress (1995a), killed a cat and masturbated on its body. The artwork was originally named Sex and Death. As an ongoing work, in 1988 it was 30 minutes, and in its 11th and final version from 1995, it was 90 minutes. The killing is included in all versions and has always been the same length: 6 seconds. These 6 seconds are probably the most (in)famous temporal moments of subjective violence in contemporary art in Finland. The artwork has come to be known as a “cat-killing
video.” Very few people know the real name of the artwork (Mäki, 2007).

The Finnish Board of Film Classification made illegal the public showing of the video in Finland. The Board defined the video as immoral and brutalizing (Mäki, 2007). In 1994, the Finnish National Gallery bought the artwork into the collection of the contemporary art museum Kiasma, in Helsinki, but has never been able to show the piece in public. In 2004, Kiasma moved the video from the museum into the Central Art Archives due to pressure from their sponsors. Conversation is usually desired in the museum, as well as the art classroom; only this time the conversation had to stop. This symbolic move indicated how subjectively violent and dangerous Mäki’s artwork was considered, even though hardly anyone has seen it.

*My Way, a Work in Progress* can be interpreted as a montage about subjective and objective violence. It deals, in part, with social and existential issues (how to live, why to live, and so on) through multiple forms of subjective violence such as war, sadomasochist sex, slaughtered animals, marginalized people, starvation, and ecological catastrophe. Examples of objective violence include political discourse, social issues, and consumerism. Mäki stated that few get killed through a subjective violent attack, but millions are killed because the rest of us desire inexpensive sneakers or cheap gasoline (Mäki, 2005). This is objective violence that does not deviate from the unexpected, but rather results from a seemingly natural desire (through language and politics, for example). Mäki contended that, through his artwork, he tried to analyze the forms of violence that are consciously part of his subjectivity, what other forms of violence are somewhere out there, and what forms of violence he unconsciously participates in by living in a capitalist society.

One might ask: Was the killing of a cat necessary? Mäki explained that, while making the video, he realized that he needed an example of the type of subjective violence that exists without any particular explanation and without any real meaning (Mäki, 2005). Often, this kind of violence is the most difficult to tolerate ethically. Perhaps it is easier to accept subjective violence, even the most “evil acts” when there is some kind of explanation. Violence just to violate is almost always beyond conscious comprehension. In the video, Mäki tries to show that objective and structural violence is much more violating because it is hidden and accepted, while self-intentional and subjective violence is horrifying when it exists without reason.
According to Levinas (2009), the Other’s face has obliged us not to kill. Being face-to-face with another being stops us from violence. The face-to-face situation manifests the ultimate ethical relation, since “the face is exposed and menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill” (p. 86). Ethical endeavors do not come from a person, but from encountering the Other (Wallenius, 2005). Face, for Levinas, means infinity, hostile or friendly. In front of another person one is open, exposed, receptive, and without their own aspirations. The Other’s face provides an entrance to the Other’s infinity. Jagodzinski (2002) stated, “the Other presents a demand on me, interferes with my sense of liberty and freedom, and calls on a responsibility that I cannot refuse” (p. 86).

Of course, Levinas did not theorize about a face-to-face encounter between a man and a cat. In contrast to other philosophers, such as Buber (Atterton, 2004), Levinas rejected the possibility of addressing face-to-face with anything other than a human being. This theory of ethics, however, has relevance for Mäki’s artwork: the face of a little cat as vulnerable, innocent, and requiring care. While we imagine the face of a cute and fluffy little pussycat named Poppe that Mäki faced, we consciously think of his abandoned ethical responsibility. What the presence of the Other’s face demands and his seemingly cruel and subjectively violent act becomes difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile in our imagination.

Another difficult part of the video is when Mäki masturbates on the decapitated head of the cat. The clip comments on the pornography industry. Mäki emphasized that this part was difficult and forced, comparing it to other parts in the video where he cut, hit, and burned himself (Mäki, 2007). Mäki stated that carrying out these scenes was nauseating for him, but he felt obliged to raise the spectacularity of subjective violence and the buried questions of objective violence in relation to consumerism. Perhaps the artwork’s otherness is so stunning that it pushes toward denying the artwork’s alterity. The artwork represents the absolute Other, and forces viewers to question their abilities to confront the alterity of Other. However, it is not only the alterity of kindness that ethics asks us to live with. Levinas argued that the ethical self–Other relation is of disinterested-ness between two distinct beings, where self is passively open to the Other, and that such openness is necessary to counteract the potentiality for violence that exists in relations between one another (Todd, 2003).
The oppression of totalitarian thinking, in Levinasian thinking, has limited the conception of the Other through our own sameness—something that Levinas (2008) called *totality*, which is an opposite of *infinity*. The totalized world, similar to the Big Other in Lacanian theory, is the world mastered by I, which means mastered in only one way. That is what prevents us from experiencing the infinity of the Other’s world (Joldersma 2002; Levinas, 1996; Varto, 2005). Mäki’s artwork does not fit into a supposed rational way of thinking. By denying the infinity of the violent artwork, the art consumer paradoxically enters into the most violating area that is a complete disavowal of the Other’s alterity (Derrida, 1978). This is evident, in part, by the staggering number and vicious content of hate letters that Mäki (2007) receives.

In a broader sense, one of the main areas of disruption in the artwork stems from the difficulty to distinguish the violent acts from the representational nature of the artwork itself. In artworks, especially those that are part of the shock art movement, these acts are strongly political, as the primarily intention is to try to influence a larger audience and shake their normative thinking. Thinking this way, the representational existence of artworks has made the act of violence less violating and, therefore, paradoxically more moral. Mäki (2007) stated that he wanted to produce an artwork where people have difficulties in identifying themselves. Without a kind and virtuous character to identify with, Mäki hoped that the spectator would be disturbed by the video and would not be able to escape its ethical accusations; this would hopefully lead the audience to doubts and distress and, finally, to change.

As a symbolic act, the artwork troubled the ethical frame and the rules and regulations of symbolic order. The psyche often does not allow subjects to cross the territory of the unpleasant act, to rethink beyond the violence as Mäki wanted. All that is left is defense. Since most people have not seen the artwork, perhaps the most disturbing confrontation the artwork asks is the confrontation with ourselves. Through the imagined artwork, we confront the Other in ourselves that is the infinity of otherness—the part in ourselves that we never get to know. For Levinas (2008), “I” is external and aggressive to the notion of myself. He stated that the “most inward sphere of intimacy appears to me as foreign and hostile” (p. 38). Perhaps the artwork is able to touch the strange and inexplicable in ourselves that cannot possibly be known, the Other in us that we are not able to master.
Of course, many scholars might argue that Mäki’s artwork, as well as Zhu Yu’s performance, would never qualify as ethical to Levinas, nor anyone else. It has held true that killing and murder is the ultimate denying of Other’s alterity and it is also the ultimate reduction and submission of self (Wallenius, 2005). However, according to Levinas, the ethical relationship to the Other is always more complex than just a relationship of two (Atterton & Calarco, 2010; Jackson, 2006; Simmons, 1999; Wallenius, 1992). The Third (le tiers) ensures that ethics is always already political. The Third sets the ethical ponderings into a horizon, where it is possible to discuss and compare between different options and ask for justice (Gregoriou, 2008; Lingis 1981; Wallenius, 1992). The Third sets up the question of justice and politics that leads the ethics toward another direction than the face-to-face relationship. With the appearance of the Third, the ego must respond to more than one Other, and it must decide whom to respond to first. This decision may lead the ego from the anarchical, ethical realm to the realm of politics and justice (Simmons, 1999). While Mäki’s artwork is not ethical according to an original Levinasian ethical face-to-face relationship, it brings the anarchical relationship to the Other into the political realm and responds to more than just one Other. Perhaps responding to the Third as a symbolic act, rather than the Other in front of the face, might raise the question of a wider dimension of ethics through violence in contemporary art.

Expanding the limits of ethics for art education

How might artworks that address subjective and objective violence have import to the field of art education, in terms of expanding the limits of ethics? Notwithstanding the question of inclusion in curricula, artworks such as the ones discussed herein often find themselves so far outside of the conventional frames of art education that they are overlooked or overtly disparaged. Anna Kindler (2009) provided an example behind the logic of such moves:

There is no doubt that late 20th century and early 21st century art has provided us with an abundance of unusual, weird, revolting, disgusting, repulsive, profane, and shocking artifacts. How much depth, however, has it contributed to our understanding; how much has it moved us toward resolutions of problems; how much has it enlightened us to create a better
world; how much has it enriched our lives on societal or personal levels? I have to confess that for all the “novelty” driving the depths of much contemporary art (even with the help of theory), I have found myself touching the bottom of astounding triviality. (p. 153)

Myriad reasons exist for why art teachers may or may not be able to use overtly violent works of art in their classroom. Many examples are offered of contemporary artworks that are mobilized in pursuit of resolving problems and “making the world better” for all of humanity. Yet, Kindler’s position echoes the dominant view on the efficacy of contemporary art for the larger field of art education—within a frame of predetermined artistic and ethical criteria, and knowable and conscious experiences.

This frame relies in part on the autonomous capacities of conscious reason to “heal” us from our unconscious fears, anxieties, and traumas. However effective and hopeful, this liberal humanist approach—centering on an always already stable individual—is at odds with a Lacanian and Levinasian perspective. In Lacanian theory, for example, the unconscious void of the subject, the Real, cannot be healed.

Any ethical project proclaiming such potentiality of ideal harmony and stability is a “flight of fantasy.” Such an ethic is “one of philosophers’ pretty little dreams”—it attempts to deny and negate the always already unconscious lack-of-being of the split subject (the negation of the negation), which is the very mark of human identity” (Indaimo, 2011, p. 141). Again, while the motivation to search for a utopian ideal of universal humanity and goodness through art is worthy and admirable, it substitutes symbolic assurance for the ambiguity of the Real—and, as a consequence, offers up only a narrow set of examples: mostly beautiful, pleasant, kind, and subjectively nonviolent artworks that elicit certain kinds of pleasure, wonder, and enjoyment (Tavin, 2007). The unintended result may exclude pain, discomfort, anxiety, and trauma from the register of ethics for art education.

Perhaps it is the trauma of not having the grounding to secure us as human subjects, in a sense, not touching the bottom that offers art educators a different possibility for an ethical encounter. When confronted with an affective moment mediated through a contemporary artwork that deals with subjective and objective violence, where the bottom (the grounding of our human subjectivity) is denuded as a fantasy and a symbolic fiction, for example, the doubts, distress, and discomfort may
lead to a kind of overflow of our secure sense of being. This encounter may then lead toward an ethical confrontation, even if it is only a small momentary transgression of the symbolic order. “This transgression is in itself a precarious act that has no grounding—no bottom so to speak—and as such immediately raises the question of ethics” (Jagodzinski, 2005, p. 270). The impossible alterity of the Real may extend to the gap of proximity with alterity of the Other, in Levinasian terms, through a responsibility for the Other.

**Toward a pedagogy of provocation**

In terms of Zhu Yu’s and Teemu Mäki’s artworks, ethics felt through an affective relationship through the works may be understood as an enterprise that raises “the general question of behavior on a meta-level of the Symbolic Order” (Jagodzinski, 2005, p. 273). In both artworks, the symbolic fictions were rendered visible and transgressed. In both cases, the art attempted to raise the antagonism between jouissance and prohibitions of subjective and objective violence. Seen through Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and Levinasian philosophy, both artworks raise important ethical questions about violence and the Other. Of course, as Todd (2003) pointed out, Levinas’s Other and the Other in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory have not been reconciled, especially given their conflicting understandings of the subject. They are taking part in very different discussions. Regardless of the tensions between the two, both discourses offer a way of thinking through the relationship between self and Other that refuses to ignore affect as significant not only to learning but to engagements with difference. Moreover, both view the fragility of the self as the source of traumatic wounding when it encounters difference, acknowledging that the Other disrupts one’s self-identity. (p. 13)

In a more general sense, the question of ethics that arise from contemporary artworks that address subjective and objective violence should be seen in light of pedagogy for art education. This might be understood as a pedagogy of provocation by the Other. As Todd (2003) pointed out, otherness is a condition for pedagogy. Through a relationship with the Other, one establishes a relationship with their own unconscious. In this sense, the standard notion (which art educators often embrace) of
a relation to the Other might be reconceptualized into a relation through the Other (Todd, 2001). These moments occur when, for example, we encounter there is no Big Other behind the Other, when we have to face the radical uncertainty of having no bottom, no grounding, the place between the symbolic and being. This pedagogy of provocation should not be understood as reducible to a set of classroom practices or a recipe for art education that translates directly into a form of psychoanalysis. Instead, we might see it as a different type of art education that may be perhaps more reflexive about its own enjoyment and anxieties with contemporary art, its relationship with subjective and objective violence through language and society, and what constitutes ethics and pedagogy, through the Other and ourselves.

**Summation**

In this article we chose Zhu Yu’s *Eating People* (2000) and Teemu Mäki’s *My Way, a Work in Progress* (1995) to provide a dislocating rupture for art education, as an example of a pedagogy of provocation. The work represents, for us, the trauma of the choice of the impossible—impossible representations of violence. However, any image or experience (a “thing”) may instigate a failure of the symbolic and an excess of alterity of the Real and the Other. According to Zupancic (2000) this happens when ethics comes into play, in the question forced upon us by an encounter with the Real: will I act in conformity to what threw me “out of joint”, will I be ready to reformulate what has hitherto been the foundation of my existence? (p. 235)

By using Lacanian and Levinasian theory, we consider ethics through a pedagogy of provocation as ensuring the idea that “ethics in art education” itself is never self-apparent and self-enclosed around consensus and sameness. Rather than only focusing on a narrow sphere of artworks that makes the world a better place— an ideal good, to be sure—or artworks that bring comfort to the totality of self, ethics might orient itself around the unknown, unfixed, anxious, uncertain, and absent subject. This is an ethics that questions the gaps between the subject and the Other, and the Real and symbolic. This is a form of ethics that begins with acceptance of the absolute disarray of subjectivity and unquestioned goodness. For the field of art education, we might begin by declaring, “I am in so far as I doubt” (Žižek, 1993, p. 69).
References


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i In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, the Law is “the primary external force managing desire, releasing the super-ego against the self-centred ego, and introducing ‘the kingdom of culture [the social/cultural normative rules and regulations]’ upon the subject to regulate its desires and domesticate its aggressivity” (Indaimo, 2011, p. 116).

ii For more information on the concept of the Real, see jagodzinski (2004, 2005, 2008).

iii Mäki prefers to use the term ‘structural violence’ instead of objective violence (personal communication, March 22, 2013)