Rancièrean Aesthetic Education as an Intervention*

Jaakko Jekunen
University of Helsinki
jaakko.jekunen@helsinki.fi

Biography

Jaakko Jekunen (MA: art education, BA: theoretical philosophy) is currently a research assistant and a Master’s degree student in theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki. Jekunen’s research interests include post-structural philosophy, subjectivity, politics of aesthetics and philosophy of (art) education.

Abstract

In this paper, I present some of the theoretical insights we can gain from the work of French philosopher Jacques Rancière. First, I will introduce his reconceptualization of politics and discuss what it implies at the philosophical level for our understanding of society. Second, I introduce his concept: the distribution of the sensible and explicate the intricate connection between politics and aesthetics it displays. Third, I discuss his notion of an aesthetic community. Finally, I will connect the threads in elaborating a conception of Rancièrean aesthetic education. I show how this idea can work as a polemical intervention.

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on the conceptual space of art education. Through this intervention, I argue we can gain important insights into the complex issues found in today’s classrooms and other sites of learning, evaluate the aims of art education and even envision some practices we can use to try out this theoretical framework in practise.

Keywords


Introduction

Art educators in Finland and elsewhere encounter a variety of identities and cultural backgrounds in their everyday work (for the changing Finnish context see e.g. Kallio-Tavin 2015). It is important for educators to have theoretical tools to examine the ideas and discourses in and around this diversity. New theories and concepts can bring about new points of difficulty and ethical or political problems, enabling critical self-reflection and helping us to build more inclusive classroom practices1. I propose that we can draw important insights for our theorizing about these issues from Jacques Rancière.2

1I am of course not the first to tackle these issues. For example, Mira Kallio-Tavin, senior university lecturer and associate professor of art education at Aalto University, has argued for the need to raise the goal of social justice to the status of a key issue in response to recent changes in the Finnish context (Kallio-Tavin 2015, pp. 27–29).

2Rancière’s work has been discussed and used in much education and art education research in recent years. The connections between Rancière’s writings on intellectual emancipation (especially from Le Maître Ignorant (1987) translated as The Ignorant Schoolmaster) and the tradition of radical pedagogy have been explored (e.g. Bingham and Biesta 2010 and Lewis 2014). Rancière’s writings on politics and democracy have been discussed in relation to democracy education (e.g. Biesta 2011, Lewis 2013, McDonnell 2014) and art education’s politics (Tervo 2014). Rancière has also been used as a theoretical background in discussing new media (see Thumlert 2015).
Politics and society

Some would argue that politics is the way political institutions function: it’s what happens in the parliament, the president’s office and other locations of power. Others would say that politics is the struggle of different parties to gain control of the state apparatus. Rancière departs from both of the above-mentioned approaches and provides a reconceptualization of politics in which the aesthetic and the political are closely intertwined.

In *Aesthetic and its Discontents* (2009a; original *Malaise dans l’esthétique* 2004), Rancière writes that

“Politics [...] is the configuration of a specific space, the framing of a particular sphere of experience, of objects posited as common and as pertaining to a common decision, of subjects recognized as capable of designating these objects and putting forwards arguments about them.” (Rancière 2009a, p. 24)

First, this means that politics is not just a collection of institutions and political positions but instead an act or an event, which configures a “sphere of experience” in which someone questions what should be decided on. This means that it is not making the decisions, but instead, it is asking what should be decided on. Second, Rancière (2004b) continues that politics is about who gets to voice the question itself. It is about who is “recognised as capable” to do so (Rancière 2009a, p. 24). Here we see that Rancière’s notion of politics is itself open-ended and contingent. The forms and actions are not outlined and prescribed in advance. If traditional conceptions of politics take for granted who gets to speak e.g. in the Parliament and whose vote counts when making the decisions, Rancière’s politics puts all of this into question.

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3I limit my considerations of Rancière’s politics to aspects relevant for my argument here. Chantal Mouffe’s “agonistic pluralism” (see Mouffe 2009 and 2013) seems to come close to Rancière in many respects but there are important difference I explicate here.
To illuminate Rancière’s conception of politics with an example, we can think about the Scandinavian states and the Sámi people. Traditionally the northern part of Scandinavia is inhabited by the indigenous Sámi people. They inhabit the Sápmi, a region which covers northern parts of the states of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia.

On 4th of December 2017, one hundred years after the declaration of independence by the state of Finland, a text was published online: *Hyvää syntymäpäivää Suomi* (Kuokkanen et al. 2017), that is *Happy birthday Finland* (author’s translation). The text was initiated by Rauna Kuokkanen, a research professor of arctic indigenous people at the University of Lapland. The text included contributions from various members of the Sámi people: Mihku-Ilmára Jenni Unni Áile, Outi Länsman, Niillas Holmberg, Jouni Laiti, Pirita Näkkäläjärvi, Outi Pieski and Marja Helander. As a present to the 100-year-old state of Finland, they published a program of decolonisation.

In the program, there were different proposals ranging from uniting the Sámi parliaments now divided by the unnatural Scandinavian state boundaries, to limiting the use of the word kuksa (being a traditional cup of the Sámi people) in commercial use. Rauna Kuokkanen expressed another demand about the Saana fell in Kilpisjärvi in the program:

“As my decolonisation present, we take Saana back. The Saana fell in Kilpisjärvi is sacred to the Sámi people. [...] We want our sacred locations to be respected in the same way that we respect places sacred to the Finns.” (Kuokkanen et al. 2017, author’s translation)

In my opinion, in this passage we have a prime example of politics à la Rancière. It talks of Saana as a “sacred place”. Finnish legislation guarantees the freedom of religion and established
religions practice their rites in suitable locations. In this sense, there are “sacred places” in cities and towns all over Finland, like synagogues and mosques. But what Kuokkanen’s demand here argues is that a natural formation, a fell, should benefit of the same kind of respect and protection as the worshipping places of established religions do.

For me, the demand about Saana brings a new kind of object up for a common decision: the respect of sacred natural formations. This seems to be a category that lacks from Finnish law. In the case of Saana, the South bank of the fell enjoys the status of a nature reserve but not because of its sacredness – it’s due to the delicate plants and animals inhabiting the area. I also think, Kuokkanen, being a member of the Sámi community, takes up by this claim about the fell a position of a new political subject\(^5\).

From here we can see something more profound about Rancière’s conception of politics. It is not only that Finnish legislation happens to have missed one category the Sámi people need, that being the category of a sacred natural formation. It seems that even the borders of the Scandinavian states have been drawn without taking the Sámi people into account\(^6\).

Rancière has not treated the case of the Sámi people, but I believe his work also sheds light on this issue. Discussing another context, Rancière (1995) has argued in *La Mésentente* (1995; translated as *Disagreement* in 1998) that societies are founded upon a fundamental miscount. When a society is seen as composed of different parties united in similar interests, there’s always someone that is left out: in Rancière’s terms the part without a part (Rancière 1995, pp. 24–25). I think that the Sámi people can be seen as the part without a part of the Scandinavian states.

We can look at a recent example of this kind of logic of exclusion of the Sámi people. Just

\(^5\)For Rancière political subjectivation happens through a refusal of a given identity (Rancière 1995, pp. 59–60). Rancière’s argument in *La Mésentente* is quite complicated and for my purposes here, I am most interested in the conception of society it implies. Therefore, I cannot in full detail discuss Rancière’s conception of politics and all its constituents.

\(^6\)I am here exploring the case of the Sámi and Sápmi as an example to illustrate Rancière’s politics. I do not believe this Rancièrean take on the issue is unique as e.g. postcolonial theories could just as well reach a similar conclusion.
a couple of years ago, a Norwegian municipality wanted to donate one of its fells’ peaks to Finland by redrawing the state boundaries. This was thought to make a great gift for the 100th Independence Day of the state of Finland (see e.g. Leisti 2016). In an interview (Satokangas et. al. 2016) published on second of August 2016, the president of the Norwegian Sámi Parliament Aili Keskitalo reminded that the land rights of the Sámi people in and around the peak proposed to be donated had not been accounted for. Keskitalo continued that it was “strange” that a proposal to donate the peak could proceed so swiftly when investigations into Sámi land rights had stagnated for years and years (Satokangas et. al. 2016). In the end, the peak was not donated but the proposal for the donation, however, seems to shed light on a logic of exclusion at work. The whole idea of a gift sidestepped the land rights of the Sámi people, as Keskitalo pointed out. I think that we can interpret this to mean that the Sámi have been left out of the count of the members of the community, therefore constituting a “part without part” of the society, to use Rancière’s concept (Rancière 1998, p. 11)\(^7\).

For Rancière (1995), politics as such is not what ordinarily goes on in communities\(^8\). In fact, “[p]olitics exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part” (Rancière 1998, p. 11). So Rancière takes the ordinary organization of any society to be exemplary of domination\(^9\). According to Rancière, (1995), it is the happening of politics that puts this logic into question, revealing the contingency or “lack of foundation” of any social order (Rancière 1995, pp. 36–37). This means that societies are fundamentally polemical in nature according to Rancière\(^10\).

\(^7\)We might reach a similar kind of conclusion, naturally with other concepts used, with a different kind of theoretical framework e.g. critical cartography.

\(^8\)I stress here that Rancière’s view on politics leaves out the nonhuman. It is only human agents that can raise a polemic and take up the position of a political subject.

\(^9\)In Rancières earlier works, namely La Mésentente (1995), Rancière conceptualizes this logic of domination as that of the police. This is not primarily intended to suggest the law enforcing agent of nation states, but instead the city states of Ancient Greece. It is in the police order that each and everyone in the society are prescribed a position and it is according to the police order that the count of a society is made and the part without a part is left out. Politics is the clash between this logic of domination and the logic of equality. (Rancière 1995, 50–51.)

\(^10\)I find many parallels between the work of Rancière and Chantal Mouffe but will only be able to comment on
The aesthetics of politics and the distribution of the sensible

Politics is for Rancière (1995) a sphere of experience in which individuals engage in, therefore, it is mediated by perception. It is about how people are seen and what kind of roles or places they are granted in the community. Who is deemed fit for the discussion about the common. This means that politics is deeply aesthetic in nature (Rancière 1995, pp. 87–88). We can see this in Rancière’s concept, the distribution of the sensible. In Politics of Aesthetics (2004a, original Partage du sensible. Esthétique et politique, published in 2000), Rancière defines the distribution of the sensible\(^ {11} \) as:

“[…] the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it. A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts.” (Rancière 2004a, p. 12, original Rancière 2000, p. 12)

We engage in the same world through our senses and we can think of this as common to all of us. However, as the “system of self-evident facts”, the distribution governs the way we perceive the world. As it affects our perceptions, it alters the way we interact with the world and with others. Thus, for Rancière (2000), the world is seen as having “parts and positions within it”. What’s more, the distribution gives everyone a place in this order (Rancière 2000, p. 12).

However, the notion entails something more and Rancière continues:

\(^ {11} \)Already in La Mésentente, Rancière utilizes the notion of a distribution of the sensible (see Rancière 1995, pp. 46, 48–49, 73).
“[the distribution of the sensible] determines the very manner in which something in common lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution.” (Rancière 2004a, p. 12, original Rancière 2000, p. 12)

Therefore, it is not only our actions that are altered. The distribution makes others think themselves capable of something and denies this capability from others. In this manner, the distribution influences the social order. The distribution restricts others while rendering some more capable. Therefore, the distribution is like the rules governing the complex networks of interaction among people.

To highlight Rancière’s notion of a distribution of the sensible, I turn to an example in a recent number of the street magazine Iso Numero. In an article (Peltola and Viitanen 2018) about the diversity of Finnish identities Malkam Karekallio, adopted from Ethiopia as a child, provides the following description of a childhood in Finland:

“As a child I never saw people of colour as doctors or teachers. It might have left its mark so that I can’t always see myself where I dream of.” (Peltola and Viitanen 2018, translation by author)

We can propose one possible interpretation of this statement in terms of a distribution of the sensible. In a society, we observe people in our daily life and as labour is divided in a complicated manner, we also categorise the people perceived into different professional categories. Some of these are regarded as more valuable or respected than others. In this way, there is a configuration of positions in a given society together with a hierarchy. As an individual makes observations about this distribution of positions, certain facts may be perceived. In the case of Malkam, the lack of people sharing a similar appearance in certain occupations. This in turn

12"Lapsena en koskaan nähnyt mustia lääkäreitä tai opettajia. Se on saattanut jättää jäljen, etten aina näe itseäni siellä, mistä unelmoin.” (Peltola and Viitanen 2018)
develops into a “system of self-evident facts of sense perceptions” as in Rancière’s definition of the distribution of the sensible (Rancière 2000, p. 12). And as the second sentence of the statement reveals, Malkam suspects that this lack of association of a similar appearance with certain professional categories might have “have left its mark so that I can’t always see myself where I dream of” (Peltola and Viitanen 2018, translation by author). In this sense, the passage highlights how a distribution of the sensible influences an individual’s thoughts about oneself and through these thoughts, their capacities to participate in the common.

For Rancière (2004b), as politics is a new sphere of shared experience, it happens in a certain distribution of the sensible, but because the distribution has already portioned the positions, politics means a disruption in this distribution. Someone demands to leave the position given to him or her and a new object for the common sphere is proposed (Rancière 2004b, p. 37). This is true in the case of the demand about Saana I discussed above, for example Keskitalo questions the fact that the Sámi community was being left out of consideration regarding the proposed donation (Satokangas et. al. 2016). This means in Rancière’s work (1995) that the distribution of the sensible is altered by the instance of politics and this is what the aesthetics of politics means for Rancière: politics happens in an aesthetic sphere of experience (Rancière 1995, pp. 87–88). Therefore, the aesthetic is already inherent to Rancière’s conception of politics.

Aesthetic community

Rancière discusses the aesthetic in depth in Politics and Aesthetics (2000). There he separates two meanings of the word ‘aesthetic’: the discourse that reflects on works of art and art theory.

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13 I do not believe this conclusion is only provided by a Rancièrean framework as a similar conclusion might result from e.g. critical race theory.

14 To add one further difference between Chantal Mouffe’s and Rancière’s approach, Mouffe (2013) seems to lack a notion of the aesthetics of politics. Art’s political import is discussed in chapter 5 of Agonistics (2013). It seems that art is only seen in an instrumental way as either helping to disrupt capitalism, furthering the cause of the Left, or as a space lending itself to the expression of agonism (Mouffe 2013, pp. 85–105). Therefore, art doesn’t itself have any import to politics itself.
That remains in step with common usage. The other sense is what I want to focus on here. According to Rancière, before we can talk about art, we need to have a way of identifying what is art and what is not. To do this, we need to have a regime of identification of art: a way to define which ways of doing result in art and which do not (Rancière 2000, p. 10). It is here that Rancière’s use of the word “aesthetic” finds its singularity. Rancière (2000) argues that we can define a certain regime of identification of art that he calls the “aesthetic regime of arts.” This regime is articulated in opposition to two other regimes of art which Rancière names the ethical and the poetic or representative regimes (Rancière 2000, pp. 27–28, 31).

For Rancière (2000), in the ethical regime of the identification of art, works of art are not seen as works of art per se but the whole question of the arts and their efficacy is dominated by the question of the image. Rancière traces this regime back to Plato and argues that for him, there is no art, there are only the arts as certain ways of doing and making resulting in different kinds of images. Some artistic practices imitate real things and are therefore harmful to the society, whereas others are grounded in valid ways of making and therefore ethical. This means that there is a direct correlation between an artistic practice and its efficacy. (Rancière 2000, pp. 27–28). In contemporary discussions this position can be discerned when someone deems that e.g. violent material in movies increases acts of violence committed by easily influenced youth.

The second regime of art is traced back to Aristotle by Rancière (2000). In the poetic or representative regime of art, we can identify works of art as such. In this regime, there are certain ways of production, i.e. the artistic practices, which share the representative principle in common; they all represent diverse things through their practices. But according to Rancière, in this regime the representative principle is also normative as it organizes the different ways of making into a hierarchy. The hierarchy aligns itself with the overall hierarchy seen in the given

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15Rancière (2008) mentions Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement (originally published as Kritik der Urteilskraft in 1790) as the first place to formulate theoretically the redundancy of the notion of perfection that is implied by the aesthetic regime (Rancière 2008).
society (Rancière 2000, pp. 28–31).

The last regime of art, or the aesthetic regime of art as it is named by Rancière (2008), opposes the two other regimes. In the aesthetic regime of art, artistic practices are not taken to represent things in the correct way or in a deceiving manner. This means that there is no one-to-one correlation of an art work and its efficacy. Rancière emphasizes this by talking about and “aesthetic break” between the work and its efficacy, thus opposing the ethical regime (Rancière 2008).

In the aesthetic regime of art, the boundaries between ways of making art and non-art are blurred according to Rancière (2000), so the organization and hierarchy of the representative regime is ruined. From the beginning of the 20th century, it has been a common artistic practice in visual arts to use materials and working methods which are not primarily associated with artmaking. This is one example of how the aesthetic regime works. There is no longer a regular division between ways of making that result in works of art and other types of production. Virtually any way of doing might result in art works. Another important aspect is the subject matter. It seems to suggest that as far as subject matter goes, there is nothing too mundane or dull for art anymore (Rancière 2000 pp. 32–33). A classic example of this kind is Warhol’s *Campbell Soup Cans* (1962).

Let us move to aesthetic communities, a notion elaborated by Rancière in the text *Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community* (2008). First, these communities are initiated by works of art belonging to the aesthetic regime\(^\text{16}\). A second characteristic of an aesthetic community is that it has a “dissensual figure”. As it stands, the ephemeral community gathered around a work of art is a clash of two regimes of sense. The distribution of the sensible of everyday experience is

\(^{16}\)Rancière (1995) mentions that Immanuel Kant spoke of an aesthetic community in this sense in the Critique of the Power of Judgement (originally published as Kritik der Urteilskraft in 1790). Rancière follows standard interpretations in saying that for Kant, a judgement of taste made by a judging subject holds a claim to be universal in the sense that the subject supposes anyone witnessing the same object ought to be obliged to agree with the judgement of taste (Rancière 1995, p. 128). I do not develop on Kant’s use of the notion.
altered in some way by the work (Rancière 2008). In my opinion, this reveals something similar to the polemic politics uncovers, but the two should not be thought to be the same. For Rancière (2004b), what belongs to the aesthetic cannot be purely political (Rancière 2004b, p. 49).

Third characteristic of an aesthetic community is according to Rancière (2008) its twofold take on being together and being separated. A work of art can be an anticipation of being together in the future. However, at the same time, it is already here as the work of art: the promise actualized. This implies a contradiction. The work anticipates a community, but at the same time as it actualizes it, therefore it is the absence of the coming community\footnote{The notion of aesthetic community developed by Rancière bears some interesting similarity to the idea of relational aesthetics of Nicolas Bourriaud (Bourriaud 2001). For Rancière (2004b), relational works aim to create works of art that themselves become new kinds of being-together without mediation and this means overstepping the role of politics (Rancière 2004b, pp. 31–32). For my purposes here, the key difference between relational art works and aesthetic communities is that the relational art works lose the tension evident in an aesthetic community: there’s no more contradiction between the coming community and the actualised community. I take this to mean that we cannot gain the insights, which I draw from Rancière’s work below.} (Rancière 2008).

As an example, let us think about Antony Gormley’s work *Clay and the Collective Body*, which he presented for the *Ihme*-festival in Helsinki in 2009. In the work, a huge cube of clay was put inside a temporary hall in central Helsinki. Thousands of people visited the location and gathered around the raw material to make something out of it. This work not only offered an interesting and open-ended activity for the participants. I interpret that it also promised a new community. A community that broke with the everyday experience of the participants. In its openness and lack of hierarchy, the anticipated community was to be egalitarian.

However, at the same time, the work was not only a promise, but as such, the actualization of that promised new being together. People did not only plan or dream about making something from the clay together. Thousands went there to mould it. In doing so, they were the ephemeral, egalitarian community promised by the work. However, the promise is of course always more than what we get. As soon as the participants entered the temporary hall, the reality of working...
with the clay didn’t actualize into an egalitarian community. Thus the promised new being together became a separation, an absence.

Rancièrean aesthetic education as an intervention

I want to propose the notion of Rancièrean aesthetic education\textsuperscript{18} by combining key insights from the three areas I have treated above: Rancière’s politics and the fundamentally polemic view of societies it implies, the aesthetics of politics best exemplified by the concept of the distribution of the sensible and, lastly, the idea of an aesthetic community. In a similar manner as Rancière has described his own writings in *A Few Remarks on the Method of Jacques Rancière* (2009b) not as theories but as “polemical interventions” (Rancière 2009b), I present the idea of Rancièrean aesthetic education as an intervention on the conceptual space of art education theory. As I show below, we can evaluate some of the aims of art education though this intervention, and even envision some practices we can use to explore more fully the implications of this theoretical manoeuvre\textsuperscript{19}.

First, Rancière’s work on politics reveals a polemic deeply inscribed into human communities. Politics is the opening up of this polemic, not an effort to erase it. This orients the goal of Rancièrean aesthetic education: it is futile to escape the polemic and to try and erase it is harmful. Instead, we should aim to embrace the polemic and distance between us\textsuperscript{20}. This doesn’t mean that art education should become cynical. It means that we should restrict some of our

\textsuperscript{18}Many readers might be reminded of Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (originally published in 1795 as Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen). According to Rancière (2004b), Schiller’s idea of an aesthetic state means that Schiller would like to replace the idea of a political Revolution with that of an aesthetic one. This would mean to substitute politics to something else, a logic of meta-politics as Rancière has named it (Rancière 2004b, pp. 47–48. See also Rancière 1995, pp. 123–124).

\textsuperscript{19}I am not proposing to replace art education with the proposed Rancièrean aesthetic education, my goal is to introduce some of the key insights of Rancière’s thinking through this intervention.

\textsuperscript{20}I believe this insight is very profound and naturally has implications for discussions of multi- and/or inter-culturalism in education. I cannot treat these subjects in the necessary depth here, but I take the idea of being together but separated as important in this wider context: how can we develop practises and theories which accommodate and embrace the diversity between us? How can we understand each other more without reducing the differences between us?
more ambitious and utopian aims and goals. For example, we should not expect art education to bring forth some more unified or more harmonious community.

Second, as the distribution of the sensible mediates all that is common between us and politics works as an interruption on this distribution, politics is thoroughly aesthetic in nature. This means that in Rancièrean aesthetic education, by focusing on the aesthetic we also learn about the political and the polemic underlying our communities. This implies that art education is in a privileged position but also holds a responsibility regarding politics: we should be careful not to erase the polemic revealed by the happening of politics.

Third, the works of art of the aesthetic regime offer the possibility of a radical kind of being-together: the aesthetic community. The tension between being together and being separated enables us to expose ourselves to the polemic underlying our communities. I argue that this provides a way to embrace the diversity in our communities and learn more about it. This aspect of Rancièrean aesthetic education renders the two previous insights applicable in practice.

It is the notion of aesthetic communities which enables us to envision how to take Rancièrean aesthetic education into account when planning our practices for classrooms and other sites of learning. As a start, we can aim to set up dissensual aesthetic communities. For instance, we can choose to discuss aesthetic works of art which somehow disrupt the distribution of the sensible. In some cases, this may expose ourselves to the polemic underlying the community made up by the learners. Another way to create an aesthetic community might be to engage in artistic practices that disrupt the roles of the distribution of the sensible; for instance, the divisions between those that make and those that do not. A further possibility is to use practices that play on the tension between being together and being apart in the way Antony Gormley’s art work did as I earlier noted. These proposals for application should be taken to provide new ideas to be tested in art education practices. I do not propose here to replace existing practices and curricula by my proposal.
Lastly, taking up the idea of a dissensual aesthetic community as the aim of teaching implies a change in attitude towards the outcome. Since there’s an aesthetic break associated in aesthetic efficacy, we can’t expect to gain some specific outcomes in our teaching. Instead, we must brace ourselves for multiple possible outcomes. In this way, Rancièrean aesthetic education challenges our ideas of education as leading to some desired learning outcome.

**Conclusion**

I conclude that the proposed idea of Rancièrean aesthetic education intervenes on art education and demands it to review its aims. We should not strive to erase or step over the diversity between us and the polemic deeply inscribed into our communities. Instead, we should aim to embrace the incommensurable between us. For example in Finnish classrooms, we can aim to open up the polemic underlying the borders of the state of Finland and the Sápmi or reveal the limiting rules inscribed into the distribution of the sensible. The intervention of the idea of Rancièrean aesthetic education also questions the way we hope to always achieve some desired learning outcomes. Instead, there are times when we should really aim for the unfathomable.

As an initial step towards exploring these theoretical insights further, we can aim to initiate ephemeral aesthetic communities in our classrooms. I suggest this could be tried by encountering art works from the aesthetic regime of art. Another option would be to utilize artistic practises which either disrupt the roles of the distribution of the sensible or which play on the tension between the coming community and its absence in the actualized work. As such, these are not uncommon art classroom practices, but I hope that with the proposed theoretical framework in mind, they could turn out to be something more.

Further research will be needed to explore these practices. In addition, enlarging the conceptual framework by seeing how the proposed outlook would be furthered by other approaches (postcolonial studies, critical race theory, critical cartography etc.). Finally, in the age of the An-
thropocene, it’s also imperative to research how the nonhuman could be taken into account, not just as an object of polemic (like Saana as a sacred natural formation), but as an agent itself.

Via this intervention and further work, I hope we can stand together in all of our diversity, but still remain separated.

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