

Private Membership Test Protocol with Low Communication Complexity

➤ **Introduction:** Private membership test (PMT) protocols enable clients to query for a certain item in server's database without revealing to the server what the item is. Clients are also prevented from learning anything else about the server's database.

➤ **Protocol:** Our protocol is based on a real world scenario. A server possesses 2^{21} malware samples and stores their hash values in 16 different subsets, based on the first 4 bits of the hash value. Each subset has 2^{17} items. Client Wants to privately search for an item with hash value equal to h .

Server

- Divides each subset into 64 segments based on the next 6 bits of the hash value (bits 5,...,10). Each segment has 2^{11} items.
- Inserts each segment into a Bloom filter with 10 hash functions. Each filter has 2^{15} bits.
- Divides each filter into 16 parts and arranges sixteen $2^3 \times 2^3$ matrices M , with parts of the filters as their elements, in such a way that the concatenation of all 16 elements in a particular position of all matrices, results to one of the Bloom filters.

Client

- Generates two distinct 2^{10} – bits prime numbers p and q based on the setting of Paillier cryptosystem. $N = pq$ so N has 2^{11} bits.
- Calculates the integer corresponding to 5th, 6th and 7th bits of h as i^* and the integer corresponding to 8th, 9th and 10th bits as j^* .
- Arranges an 8-component vector T (resp. T'), where all the components are 0 except the component i^* (resp. j^*), that is equal to 1.
- Encrypts the components of T (resp. T') and generates vector (α_i) (resp. (β_j)).

$(\alpha_i), (\beta_j), N$ and first 4 bits of h

For each of the matrices M :

- Computes $\sigma_i = \prod_{j=0}^7 (\beta_j)^{M(i,j)} \bmod N^2 = E(M(i, j^*))$.
- Represents $\sigma_i = u_i N + v_i; i \in \{0, 1, \dots, 7\}$.
- Computes $u = \prod_{i=0}^7 (\alpha_i)^{u_i} \bmod N^2 = E(u_{i^*})$.
- Computes $v = \prod_{i=0}^7 (\alpha_i)^{v_i} \bmod N^2 = E(v_{i^*})$.

- ❖ Client spends 1.8s to generate α_T and $\beta_{T'}$.
- ❖ Client sends 8 KB data to the Server.

(Hash functions of the filter)
and (u, v) for each matrix

- ❖ Server spends 0.9s to generate u_j and v_j .
- ❖ Server sends 16 KB data to the Client.
- ❖ Bloom filter has a false positive rate of 0.001.

- Decrypts all the sixteen pairs:
 $D(D(u)N + D(v)) = D(u_{i^*}N + v_{i^*}) = D(\sigma_{i^*}) = M(i^*, j^*)$.
- Concatenates the results into a Bloom filter.
- Performs membership test without the Server.

➤ **Conclusion:** Homomorphic encryption allows server to search in the matrix without knowledge of client's keys. The proposed protocol has significantly smaller communication complexity than prior art.

- ✓ Paillier, Pascal. "Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes." In *International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques*, pp. 223-238. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999.
- ✓ Chang, Yan-Cheng. "Single database private information retrieval with logarithmic communication." In *Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy*, pp. 50-61. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004.
- ✓ In order to reduce the false positive rate to 1 out of a million, client can repeat the protocol for the next 6 bits of h (bits 11th-16th).