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
# HardScope: Thwarting DOP with Hardware-assisted Run-time Scope Enforcement

## Motivation: Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) Attacks

- Memory unsafe languages are prone to **memory corruption vulnerabilities**
- **DOP attacks** corrupt non-control data to e.g. escalate privilege or leak information
- Existing security features including *NX*, *ASLR*, *CFI* are **ineffective against these attacks**
- Current practical DOP attacks rely on **accessing out-of-scope variables**

## High-level Idea

- Enforcing variable visibility rules at run-time
- **Challenge:** Preventing DOP attacks requires mediating all memory accesses, **cumbersome in software only**
- **Solution:** **Hardware-assisted enforcement** through extensions to instruction set, processor and compiler
- **Protects program data at run-time** (e.g., control-data, local and global variables)
- **Prevents out-of-scope memory accesses**




Compile-phase design of HardScope

## Implementation

- Program code instrumented **during compilation**
  - Analyze variables used in C program functions
  - Instrument function prologues, epilogues and call-sites with HardScope instructions
- Hardware assisted **run-time** enforcement
  - Instrumented HardScope instructions maintain memory access rules during execution
  - Rules can be delegated on context switches
  - Rules enforced on each memory access

## Storage Region Stack (SRS)

- Each *SRS frame* contains *storage regions* accessible from an *execution context*, i.e. code block
- Frames are pushed and popped to stack on context switches
- Permission to access memory from current context is checked on each load/store



HardScope SRS architecture and operations

## Evaluation

- RISC-V instruction set extension, Spike simulator and Pulpino core hardware support
- **Low performance overhead (~7%)**
- **Small area size in hardware implementation**